Austin perceived the need to classify speech acts as early as 1962. According to his own testimony, his attempt remained inchoate (1962: 147-163). In 1969, Searle constructed a classification which was subsequently used to characterize the primitive forces of illocutionary logic (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985). The relevance of that classification stems from a certain idea of communication. I would like to show that an alternative classification can be developed through a resolutely pragmatic approach to communication, rather than through a representational and semantic approach to language.

My objectives here will be: (i) to underline the main weaknesses of Searle’s taxonomy, (ii) to outline the main directions of a dialogical approach to speech acts, (iii) to propose a brief overview of my own classification of those acts, and (iv) to stress the heuristic value and the limits of that new classification.
1. **Main weaknesses of Searle’s taxonomy**

Like any classification, Searle’s taxonomy is based on a certain number of explicit criteria: illocutionary point, direction of fit, psychological state expressed, and a set of three conditions imposed on each act (propositional content, preparatory condition, sincerity condition). However, illocutionary point in fact stands for a mere definition of the act. Moreover, the psychological state and the three conditions merely describe the act. Thus, it is only direction of fit that bears a diacritical value and provides the principle of closure of the classification.

Four possible directions of fit are defined: words-to-world, world-to-words, empty, and double. Two questions arise concerning those directions of fit: (i) Can we abstractly predict other possible cases, such as words-to-words or world-to-world reflexivity? (ii) How can we explain, retain or remove possible cases from a philosophical point of view—that is, under a general concept of speech acts? For instance, does the empty direction of fit make sense philosophically speaking? While direction of fit determines the conditions of satisfaction for an act—for example, the truth of an assertion in terms of correspondence between what is said and what is—the admission of an empty direction of fit for expressives excludes the possibility of defining conditions of satisfaction for those acts (Vanderveken 1992: 16).

If we admit that direction of fit, such as Searle defined it, provides the discriminating criterion and the principle of closure of the classification, we should logically expect only four fundamental types of speech act to be retained. Yet, five types exist, since world-to-words direction of fit is possible in both directives and commissives. Why is this? Because in directives, the expected action on the world is the hearer’s, while in the case of a commissive, the promised action is that of the speaker. This distinction appears to be necessary. But how is it introduced? It appears in illocutionary point, but does not work as an explicit classification criterion. It occurs from the very beginning and institutes, in a purely *ad hoc* way, a sub-section of the first distinction according to direction of fit. This shows the need to build a hierarchic organization that would allow for the progressive and explicit
introduction of four criteria.

Apart from this purely formal shortcoming, the fact that the distinction between speaker and hearer is only available for directives and commissives relates to a deeper philosophical limitation: the monological analysis of speech acts as defined by Austin. I will show that, in addition to consideration of the speaker, a classification of speech acts has to include consideration of the addressee as an explicit criterion for each type of speech act. Furthermore, I will underline the need to account for the dialogical dimension of communicational interaction, beyond the simple analysis of discourse.

2. Elements of a pragmatic approach to speech acts
The logical coherence of a classification does not exist eo ipso, but is subordinated to a previous theoretical choice. Before putting forward a reasoned classification of speech acts, I will briefly sketch the philosophical considerations which underlie and justify that classification.

The approach I will adopt is pragmatic in the etymological sense of that term: it falls under a general theory of action. Austin rightly saw that speech acts are primarily acts. Thus they have all the characteristics of human actions: they are caused by an agent with beliefs and knowledge, desires and intentions, values and prohibitionsii. From a practical and epistemic point of view, that agent is minimally rationaliii and above all, s/he is defined as one of the players in a game controlled by cooperation and competition rules. Actions immediately depend on relationships between people and relationships between people and the world. Therefore, I shall bear in mind that some characteristics of speech acts depend on a more general theory of human action, that is, on a praxeology.

Nevertheless, the acts in question are specific: they are speech acts. At this point, the particularity of the intention that causes them comes into consideration: a communicative intentioniv. The leading objective of all speech acts is to make something known, to recognize and share beliefs, intentions and values. I will then distinguish between individual, interwoven, and mutual mental states. For example, in the case of belief: “I believe it is raining”, “I
know you believe it is raining”, “We believe it is raining”.

Within this praxeological perspective, I intend to analyse of speech acts under two criteria: interactional and transactional.

Strictly speaking, interactional analysis accounts for communicative interaction. By means of informational communication, we aim to carry out an action on somebody else by first modifying their mental state. Thus, the first function of an assertion is not that of expressing, in a representational way, an utterance describing (or not describing) a fact of the world, but that of communicatively making the addressee aware of a conviction and a commitment of the speaker about a fact of the world. That first function is also that of obtaining in return a cognitive reaction on behalf of the addressee. The concern is belief before truth, hence Moore’s pragmatic paradox: I cannot assert that the sky is blue if I do not believe it.

However, the term ‘communication’ must not lead us astray: the purpose is not to communicate messages produced by the speaker as a sovereign master of meaning and truth. The critique of this model need not be put forward here, as it has been developed by Francis Jacques (1979), and we will conceive of interaction as an interlocutive relationship such that the speaker and addressee are co-actors in a dialogical process. If human transactions are frequently competitive, all discursive interactions are cooperative. As Grice has shown, discursive interaction is governed by specific maxims that submit speech acts to higher-level constraints which depend mainly upon the purpose of the dialogue. According to the kind of purpose involved, projective models of dialogue provide a framework which controls the choice of dialogical strategies, and which also conditions the dialogical functions of speech acts. In this respect, Austin’s and Searle’s work remains fundamentally monological.

Let us now consider the transactional dimension of the analysis. Generally, communicative interaction does not have a purpose in itself. It is heteronomic: communicative cooperation aims, in the end, at non-communicative cooperation, a transformation of the world by or with another individual. The captain who shouts “The ship is sinking” does not simply observe a fact. Above all, he is trying to incite an effective, non
communicative reaction from his crew and passengers: the evacuation of the ship. The communicative interaction is a link in a chain of non-communicative transactions: we contact a medical institution to make an appointment with a doctor, to be diagnosed, to start therapy and to achieve recoveryix.

As an essential activity, the use of language allows us to analyse facts, think about purposes, evaluate strategies, decide on actions. As such, it has the value of a communicative path subordinated to non-communicative concerns and aims. Because any speech act, more or less directly, always aims at a transformation of the world, its meaning depends on its transactional aim. As Wittgenstein reminds us: “What we say receives its meaning from the rest of our actions”x. Thus the purpose of discursive interaction, the places and roles of the speakers and the strategic constraints that they endure are matters for transactional analysis. This analysis will be based on non-linguistic, strictly praxeological data, provided in particular by consideration of the situation, the strategies of the agents, and the background of their common knowledge.

But from a linguistic point of view, part of the information of transactional nature is expressed, in the locutionary contents of the speech act, by the dictum: for example, “The ship is sinking” describes a non-linguistic action, the subject of which is not the agent of the speech act. Then, in any speech act, we will have to distinguish the agent of the interaction, the speaker, who is generally implicit (in our example, the captain), from the subject of the transaction expressed by the dictum; in our example, the sinking ship.

Within the framework outlined, we can now proceed to present the classification of speech acts.

3. A new classification of speech acts
The new classification that I propose (cf. Table 1), in line with a pragmatic approach to speech acts, has been constructed by the explicit and gradual introduction of four criteria.

1° – Inasmuch as the ultimate transactional purpose of any speech act is a transformation of the worldxi, our first distinction will be between acts that institute a discursive mediation with the purpose of obtaining this
transformation secondarily, and acts that immediately operate this transformation by themselves. Here, we meet the privilege initially granted by Austin to performatives: we use them to do things with words. We will therefore begin by separating non declarations from declarations on the grounds that only declarations provide a symbiosis between interaction and transaction, by means of institutional and extra-linguistic rules. The action is made through the speech act and this interaction directly produces a transaction: an effective transformation of the world. An example of a transaction is that produced by the declaration of a priest: “I declare you husband and wife”.

2° – The second criterion specifies the relationship between interaction and transaction. In simple terms, if we reduce interaction to “words” and transaction to “world”, we meet the direction of fit defined by Searle. For declarations, the double direction remains unchanged: the interaction simultaneously carries a transactional value, i.e. the action is produced by the declaration. Words-to-world direction of fit also remains for assertives: an assertion expresses the responsibility of the speaker in relation to his/her belief about the world. As for world-to-words fit, it will define what I will call obligatives, which group together all the interactions referring to a future transaction. Nevertheless, the empty direction of fit will be challenged as pragmatically irrelevant. If words and world have no relationship, the speech act loses its sense, its purpose. In our actional approach, we can only conceive of interaction as aiming at a transaction. We will see that in fact, expressives, far from being disqualified, constitute a sub-category of assertives. On the contrary, we will give a pragmatic sense to the logical possibility of reflexivity, not of world-to-world fit—which is not the concern of discursive communication—but for the words-to-words variety. As an interaction, a speech act can have itself, or another speech act, as its own transactional object. As eloquently attested by analyses of real dialogues, we often have to define the terms we use in order to remove some ambiguity. For example, “By the word ‘…’ I meant…” . In other cases, we need to comment on our discursive interaction in order to clarify its purpose or to ease memory effort:
“I have just indicated that…”. Thus, an important role has to be given to metadiscursive acts which control the discursive interaction. Thus, among the six logically possible directions of fit (double, words-to-world, world-to-words, words-to-words, world-to-world and empty), only the last two are excluded as pragmatically irrelevant.

If we arrange speech acts according to their actional power—that is, their degree of involvement in the transformation of the external world—metadiscursives will occupy the first degree, were action can be reduced to speech, and declarations will mark the highest point where, in a magical way, speech becomes action. Assertives and obligatives will occupy intermediate positions. Finally, the relationship between the interactional and transactional dimensions, which is theoretically fundamental, provides the criterion of closure for the classification: since four cases are pragmatically significant, we only accept four main classes of speech acts.

3° – By taking into account the relationship between the agent of interaction and the subject of transaction, a third criterion will allow for a new sub-category.

In the case of declarations, the agent of the interaction is always the speaker who uses the active form “I hereby open the session” or the expression “I declare the session open”. S/he is inevitably different from the subject of the transaction, which can be expressed through the impersonal form “The session is opened”.

In the case of obligatives, this third criterion justifies the distinction, introduced in an ad hoc way by Searle, between directives, where the subject of the transaction (the addressee) is not the agent of the interaction (the speaker) (as in “Open the door”); and commissives, where the subject of the dictum is actually the agent of the interaction, or speaker: “I will open the door”.

The same criterion allows us to distinguish, among assertives, between constatives which describe a fact of the world potentially involving the addressee or a third person, cases where the agent of the interaction is not the subject of the dictum (“The door is open”, “He opened the door”), and
descriptives where agent and subject are merged because the assertion refers to the speaker: “I opened the door”.

Furthermore, this third criterion allows us to distinguish, among metadiscursives, between those which concern an element of the speech itself or the content of the addressee’s intervention – which we can call quotatives – and those which refer to the discursive intervention of the speaker, the subject of the transaction then being identical to the agent of the interaction. In the latter case, we meet again the expositives initially defined by Austin (1962: 161-2) as permitting “the clarification of the use and of the reference of the words …/… the elucidation of communication”.

4° – A fourth criterion consists in taking into account a new distinction relative to transactional contents, which are based on an action or a state.

That criterion is neutral for declarations because they describe, by definition, an action and not a state.

On the contrary, this distinction, which is relative to the aspect of the transaction, produces a dichotomy between those directives which force the addressee to act and those which modify his/her mental state. This is pragmatically relevant because we often have to share a belief, an intention and a value with the addressee to make him/her act on the world. To obey an order inevitably necessitates the acceptance of some form of submission taking into account the mental states imposed by discursive interaction, explicitly or not. Take for example a soldier who obeys an order. Mutatis mutandis, a similar dichotomy applies to commissives: “I will be careful” concerns an attitude, a state, not an action.

Similar distinctions are inevitably made in the case of assertives. For constatives, the observation of a state differs from the observation of an action. Then we are able to see the contrast between statives, e.g. “The door is open”, and factives, e.g. “The door is opening”. For the descriptives, if the transaction describes an action, a performance of the speaker, we are dealing with a behabitive: “I have opened the door”. On the contrary, if the description concerns the speaker's mental state, we are dealing with an expressive. Here, the object of the mental state is secondary, as shown by some expressives
which do not concern a determined external object, for example: “I am sad”. In accordance with grammatical intuition, we will say that those expressives actually have an object which can be called the mental state of the subject. As the mental states of the speaker form his/her internal world, we could say that, as a sub-class of assertives, expressives are no longer exceptions and have their own truth and satisfaction conditions, defined in terms of correspondence between the proposed description and the effective state of the speaker. But this would presuppose that the internal world of the speaker constitutes an autonomous reality, directly attainable to interlocutors by mere introspection. As we challenge any representational approach, we adopt not a truth condition but a veracity criterion which can be defined in terms of fulfilling the speaker's promise to act for the addressee.

Finally, as for metadiscursives, while an expositive inevitably takes into account a discursive interaction of the speaker, a quotative can either describe a state of speech, e.g. “‘The King of France’ is a definite description”, or come back to an interaction of the addressee, e.g. “You have not specified what you mean by ‘definite description’ ”.

According to our generic definition of any action’s agent, we can consider refining the sub-class of the expressives according to the description which can have to do with cognitive states (belief or knowledge), volitive states (desire, intention) or axiologic states (appreciation or critic), or even affective states (pleasure or pain). We are then left wondering what happens for each state involved in the preceding sub-classes, except for the metadiscursives which are based, by definition, on purely discursive states. For example: “I recommend this film to you” is an axiological directive, “You must know this…” is a cognitive directive and “To pass an examination, it is necessary to have a strong will” is a volitive directive.

4. Heuristic value and limits of the classification of speech acts
Even if the vertical axis of our classification is closed and cannot admit more than four fundamental types of speech acts, its horizontal axis remains open. That opening proves that, to some extent, those who, in accordance with the
“second” Wittgenstein, stressed the complexity of natural language were right. Should we then be afraid of a ‘combinatorial explosion’? No, because the horizontal expansion will occur not in a purely empirical way but according to the theory which has directed the elaboration of the classification, that is to say, according to the actional approach outlined. The classification, as I present it, has only a heuristic value: it allows us to have an accurate image of all the possible speech acts, but it would constitute neither the source point of the analysis nor its final target. Its criteria explicitly take into account the double dimension (interactional and transactional) of any speech act. However, we still have to develop the analysis of each dimension. As a conclusion, let us indicate simply how to go about analyzing those dimensions.

1° – Concerning the transactional dimension, every speech act depends on a general action theory which specifies some conditions for the activation of the action, for its body and for its expected results. Those conditions once again place the transaction within a general planning framework. We will not go into details, but let us show how this actional framework allows us to reinterpret Searle’s and Vanderveken’s analyses.

Searle’s preparatory and sincerity conditions naturally belong to the conditions for activation. They clarify the mental state of the transaction subject\textsuperscript{xxii} and the action constraints. For example, a directive implies the speaker’s wish to perform the transaction and his/her belief in the addressee’s capacity to perform it.

In fact, Searle’s propositional content conditions concern the conditions placed on the action body and particularly on the tense of the transaction verb, in relation to the moment of the interaction. A declaration is necessarily operative in the present. An obligative concerns a future transaction, one not yet performed\textsuperscript{xxiii}. For assertives, the situation is more complicated: whereas constatives and expressives allow past, present and future tenses, behabitives will not accept the future tense. Concerning metadiscursives, while expositives and action quotatives admit past, present and future tenses, state quotatives exclusively require the present tense, which, as in mathematics (“2 and 2 equal 4”), is an eternal present.
Daniel Vanderveken’s *mode of achievement of the point* depends on the conditions imposed on the expected result. Those conditions specify the transaction modalities and the constraints placed on the subject of that transaction. The speaker waits for the addressee to have his *request* fulfilled, but offers him the possibility of refusal. On the other hand, he requires the addressee to obey his *order*.

A similar situation obtains for conditions of satisfaction. The order is obeyed only if the addressee actually performs the expected transaction\(^{xxiv}\). It is clear that Cohen and Perrault (1979) are right to stress that speech acts depend on a general logic of action, which has been too long neglected by Austin’s heirs. Speech acts, however, cannot be simplified into a logic of action, because of the specificity of their own discursive interactions.

2° – Next, the interactive dimension of the analysis has to be considered. The *conditions of success* depend on it. To obey an order, the addressee has first of all to understand it and to accept it as it is. But, as Searle admits, those conditions of success do not at all take into account the crucial fact that speech acts are elements of positively dialogical strategies\(^{xxv}\). Therefore, this requires dialogical constraints of higher order which do not concern the classification of speech acts. In particular the purely *dialogical functions* of speech acts are to blame because they are elements of interlocutive strategies. Thus an assertion can have different dialogical functions according to the type of dialogue, its place in the dialogical process, and the speaker who utters it. Elsewhere (Vernant 1999) I have shown that in an informative dialogue, an assertion uttered by the speaker can have the positive value of an *answer* to a question, the critical value of a *reply*, or even the negative value of a *challenge*. For example, if the speaker starts up a conversation with the question “What time is it?”, the answer will be “It is 12 o’clock”, the reply “I did not understand your question” and the challenge “I don’t care about the time”. Thus, considered independently of their dialogical functions, speech acts are only abstractions, a moment of analysis. The great problem now is to determine the dialogical function of the speech acts in a given interactive and transactional strategy.
The classification I have just proposed is of course not the only possible one. Each taxonomy is only a perspective which constitutes a phenomenon and its worth lies only in the adopted point of view. I think I have shown that the actional approach, freed from representational and monological prejudices, allows us to make the classification of speech acts simpler and more coherent. At the same time, the actional approach assigns a crucial role to the classification, between an analysis of the communicative interactions and a study of the transactions with others and about the world.

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<th>Tense of the transaction verb</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>OBLIGATIVES</td>
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<td>COMMISSIVES</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td><em>I will be careful</em></td>
<td><em>F₁</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>OBLIGATIVES</td>
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<td>DIRECTIVES</td>
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<td>OBLIGATIVES</td>
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<td><em>is a definite description</em></td>
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</table>

*Table 1. Classification of speech acts*
Notes

i. Cf. Vanderveken (1990: 103-124). Note that the primitive illocutionary forces have no special mode of achievement and a neutral degree of strength.


iii. From a practical viewpoint, cf. Cherniack (1986: 12) : “If A has a particular belief-desire set, A would undertake some, but not necessarily all, of those actions that are apparently appropriate”. In an epistemic aspect, cf. Vanderveken (1995).

iv. In a naturalistic perspective, Searle tries to reduce the linguistic form of intentionality (meaning intentions) to a primitive biological form. Starting from the speakers’ intentions, he is led to subordinate communicative intentions (which he reduces in fact to the Austinian “uptake”) to representing intentions, cf. Searle (1983: 161 & 165-6, 168). In my opinion, this betrays a twofold illusion: representational and monological. Communicative interaction is a form of action that, as such, has biological roots. But, more specifically, it is characterized by its communicative dimension. This communication simultaneously institutes agents as interlocutors and shares their intentions and their relationships with the world. Thus the representation is derived from the interactional and transactional processes, cf. Vernant (1997 : 97-105).
To simplify, I restrict here communicative actions to linguistic acts, but it is well known (since Austin 1962: 119) that simple gestures can express a meaning intention. Remember the Neapolitan gesture that Sraffa opposed to the representational conception of the “first” Wittgenstein. There exists also a language of eyes, of body, etc. The communicative action goes beyond the bounds of the linguistic act.

Charles Bally (1944: 50) precisely analyzes the assertion “The Earth turns” into three components: 1° – an act of communication: I make you know that […], 2° – a modus: [I am convinced that {}], 3° – a dictum: {The Earth turns}. On the contrary, Searle (1979: 3) insists on the fact that the assertion has, by definition, no perlocutionary effect: “Statements and promises are not by definition attempts to produce perlocutionary effects in the hearer”. This leads us to deny the interlocutive value of assertions. Concerning assertion, Peirce has already insisted on the responsibility of the speaker towards the hearer with respect to his belief of a fact of the world. The hearer admits this belief only if the speaker can justify it, cf. Jarrett E. Brock (1981). I have revisited the definition of assertion (and lie) in Vernant (1997: 59-85).

For example, we can think of a negotiation ending a conflict. If transactional interests are obviously divergent, the simple fact that there is negotiation supposes a discursive cooperation that transcends the conflict of interests. But note that, in its praxiological acceptation, cooperation does not mean consensus.

It will be noted that our actional approach provides a framework allowing the integration of “perlocutionary” aspects, considered by Austin as non-conventional and unpredictable “effects”. For the relationship between pragmatically and praxiological levels, cf. Vernant (1999).


Our use of the term “world” here is *ad hominem*: we summarize Searle’s problematics. But while Searle admits only one world – he takes reality for granted – our analysis leads us nevertheless: 1° – to multiply worlds by distinguishing the common external world from the internal worlds of the speaker (cf. expressives) and that of the addressee (cf. statives like: “John is sad”), 2° – more fundamentally, to challenge the representational approach of Searle and Vanderveken inferred in resorting to a logical semantics: each different world represents the result of a specific process of interaction and transaction.

As Searle (1979: 18) has observed, this institutional feature is missing from “declarations that concern language itself, as for example when you say, ‘I define, abbreviate, name, call or dub’”. To my mind, this justifies the redefinition of those “declarations” as metadiscursives (precisely expositives). A definition in standard logic supposes the respect of the conventions admitted by the community of logicians. But for all that, it does not cause a transformation of the external world, but only that of the logical speech. Therefore, it is actually metadiscursive, as any metalogic statement.

Here we reach the magical dimension of language: the agent has to be the guardian of a power and the formula has to be a ritual. But the action produced no longer operates a transformation on natural phenomena but on social productions. This social magic is based on the delegation of

Searle (1979: 14) noticed that: “It would give us a more elegant taxonomy if we could show that they [directives and commissives] are really members of the same category”. We have established that in order to do this, we only have to separate the criteria of classification without taking into account – in an ad hoc way – concerning the criterion of fit the purpose of the observed transaction and the nature of the agent.

Searle (1979: 6) mentions “expressions are used to relate utterances to other utterances and to the surrounding context”, but he analyzes them as a sub-section of assertives (1979: 11,13). Curiously, he underlines their syntactic specificity but concludes : “But this very genuine syntactical difference does not mark a semantic difference big enough to justify the formation of a separate category” (1979: 25). Our actional approach shows the pragmatic necessity to make this syntactically and even semantically relevant distinction (since there is actually a modification of the referential relation). The metadiscursive capacity is, along with the dialogical function, a fundamental characteristic of the human language, cf. Benveniste (1966: 61). The fact that Searle disregards it is the result of the Tarskian distrust in “semantically closed” languages. The reflexivity which, since Russell, should be removed from logical language – cf. Vernant (1993: 271-305) – constitutes a precious advantage of the interlocutive use of natural language. We recall that Jakobson (1960) introduced a metalinguistic function.

We will notice that the verb “to declare” has two uses: 1° – It is the emphatic form of a metadiscursive, e.g. “I declare that democracy is the less bad political system”. The accent is put on the discursive interaction
the object of which is a fact expressed by the substantival clause. 2° – It is the emphatic form of a declaration, *e.g.* “I declare the meeting closed”. The emphasis is again put on the discursive interaction which actually shows the social characteristic of the transaction and the power delegated to the speaker, but this time the object is not an independent fact: it is the non discursive transaction institutionally produced by the discursive interaction.

xvii. It would be necessary here to develop the analysis; the “subject” is in fact the object of the interaction: the session would not open by itself. This clearly shows the singularity of declarations.

xviii. We use “behabitive” with a different meaning to Austin.

xix. In this case, the state is not “Intentional”, cf. Searle (1983: 2), where Searle gives the examples of “undirected anxiety, depression and elation”. In other cases, the state can concern an object: “I like the blue color”, a fact “I hate rain”, an action or somebody else’s state “I wish you success”.

xx. What we call here for simplicity “the internal world of the speaker” has no intrinsic reality. It is the result of the interactional and transactional process, cf. Wittgenstein (1953), §§ 256 sq. Only this pragmatic approach allots to the lie all its strategic value: you do not lie just to lead others astray but to modify their conduct without them knowing, cf. Vernant (1997: 71-75). We define the veracity criterion in terms of *discursive coherence* and *pragmatic consistance*, cf. Vernant (1997: 70).

xxi. Searle (1979: 5) mentions pleasure in his sincerity conditions or “what is good or bad for the speaker and hearer” (1979: 10), but he does not exploit that axiological dimension which is important in an actional approach.
xxii. We also take into account the degree of strength, defined by Searle and Vanderveken (1985: 98).

xxiii. The tense of the transaction does not always merge with that of the verb. Thus, a directive expressed by an imperative present advises the addressee to perform a future action. We will notice that the Ten Commandments are expressed in the future tense.

xxiv. In illocutionary logic, the conditions of satisfaction are a generalization of the truth conditions. They are always conceived in terms of correspondence between words and things. After their definition, they remain dependent on a representational conception. Truth and satisfaction have to be redefined in pragmatic and praxiological terms. We have already given an example of expressives, so let us now briefly consider the assertives. The truth of an assertion is not the result of an impossible correspondence between description and state, but that of an agreement between the interlocutors during the interactional and transactional processes. That agreement can be expressed in terms of shared beliefs – if we conceive beliefs as dispositions to act – depending on forms of life, cf. Wittgenstein (1953), § 241.

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ABSTRACT:

Austin was the first to see the need to classify speech acts. Searle put forward a classification of primitive illocutionary acts. However, Searle's classification remains dependent upon a monological, representational, and merely semantic conception of language. This article (i) points out the main weaknesses of Searle's taxonomy, (ii) draws the main lines of a dialogical approach to speech acts as it results from a praxiological conception of communication, (iii) presents a simpler and more coherent classification of speech acts based on the progressive and explicit introduction of four criteria, and (iv) explores the heuristic value and limits of the proposed classification.

PRESENTATION:
